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ABSTRACT
In recent years, deep neural networks demonstrated state-of-the-art performance in a large variety
of tasks and therefore have been adopted in many applications. On the other hand, the latest studies
revealed that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples obtained by carefully adding
small perturbation to legitimate samples. Based upon the observation, many attack methods were
proposed. Among them, the optimization-based CW attack is the most powerful as the produced
adversarial samples present much less distortion compared to other methods. The better attacking
effect, however, comes at the cost of running more iterations and thus longer computation time
to reach desirable results. In this work, we propose to leverage the information of gradients as
a guidance during the search of adversaries. More specifically, directly incorporating the gradients
into the perturbation can be regarded as a constraint added to the optimization process. We intuitively
and empirically prove the rationality of our method in reducing the search space. Our experiments
show that compared to the original CW attack, the proposedmethod requires fewer iterations towards
adversarial samples, obtaining a higher success rate and resulting in smaller ℓ2 distortion.
1 Introduction
With the rapid growth in network depth and width as well as the improvement in network structure and topology, the
use of deep neural networks (DNNs) has been successfully extended to many applications. For instance, the state-of-
the-art DNNs can achieve extremely high accuracy in image classification, which could be even higher than the level
humans can reach.
However, the latest studies [1] revealed the high vulnerability of neural network models to adversarial attacks: adding
a carefully designed, small perturbation to an image could result in a rapid decrease in classification confidence or even
misclassification of a well-trained network, even though the perturbation is too small to be distinguished by humans.
Such images with small perturbations, namely adversarial samples, raise a severe security threat for deep learning
technology. Extensive research studies have been carried out in adversarial attacks to explore the vulnerability of
neural networks as well as in defense techniques to protect the systems and applications.
Among many attack methods proposed in recent years, the fast gradient sign method (FSGM) [2] and its iterative
variation [3] have drawn significant attention. The methods tend to exploit the gradients of classification loss to craft
adversarial images. The principle is pretty straightforward as gradients are correlated to the direction, a change along
which potentially influences the classification in the most significant way. The methods, however, treat every pixel the
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same, that is, the magnitude of introduced perturbation is exactly the same for all the pixels. This often makes the
adversarial samples more noticeable since humans are much more sensitive to the difference in low variance area [4],
e.g., the background of an image. Compared to the original images, the adversaries generated by FGSM could be a lot
blurred. Examples include Figure 2(d) in [2] and Figure 4 in [5].
CW attack [6] is another widely adopted adversarial attack method. As an optimization-based approach, CW attack
first defines an objective or a loss function, and then searches for the optimal perturbation while maintaining the distor-
tion small during the procedure. As such, CW could produce adversaries with much smaller and more imperceptible
distortion. The performance, however, comes at the cost of speed. For instance, [6] performed 200,000 optimization
iterations for every image when evaluating their method. Such a high computation cost is not practical, especially con-
sidering the fast growth in dataset size. In addition, the implementation of CW attack can sometimes be pretty tricky
and requires careful parameter selection to obtain the desirable data reported in the paper. This is indeed a common
scenario in optimization based methods.
Our work aims at a strong and effective adversarial attack. We propose to leverage the gradient information in the
search of adversarial examples. Inspired by the FGSM concept, the gradients are used as a guidance in calculating
the perturbation. Unlike FGSM that utilizes a universal magnitude to all the pixels, however, our approach will assign
each pixel with its own magnitude of perturbation. The magnitude optimization uses the same loss function as CW,
which corresponds to the general expectation in crafting adversarial attacks. In a nutshell, our method constrains the
perturbation with the gradients, which in turn reduces the search space of adversarial examples.
In the work, we intuitively prove the rationality of our method in reducing the search space. Empirically, our exper-
imental results show that our method can reach a higher attack successful rate while applying smaller distortion and
requiring much fewer iterations than the original CW attack method [6]. The effectiveness of our method is further
demonstrated through the comparison with I-FGSM [3] and L-BFGS [1].
2 The Proposed Method
Algorithm 1: Our algorithm to leverage gradients g in the search of adversarial examples.
Input: The legitimate image x, the target class t, the initial magnitude θ0.
Output: The adversarial image x′.
x′0 ← x, i ← 0
while C(x′
i
) 6= t and i < out_step do
θ ← θ0, g ← ∇x′
i
f(x′
i
, t)
x′
i+1 ← x
′
i
− θ · g/||g||2
loss ← ||x′
i+1 − x||
2
2 + c · f(x
′
i+1, t)
minimize loss and update θ
i← i+ 1
return x′ ← x′
i
As aforementioned, although FGSM and I-FGSM can quickly use gradients to generate the perturbations, the large
magnitude of the universal perturbations applied on each pixel could make such perturbations easily perceptible to
human eyes. CW attack, which optimizes the perturbation generation process using a well-defined loss function, can
solve this issue by exploring the adversarial images with small perturbations. However, the computational cost of CW
attack can be huge since a large number of iterations need to be performed to minimize the loss and adjust the constant
c. This fact greatly hinders applications of such optimization-based attacks in processing a large dataset.
Thus, we propose to incorporate gradient information in the optimization process of CW attack to guide the search
process and reduce the search time. We use δ to denote the perturbation, i.e., x′ = x+δ. While CW updates δ during
each iteration, we set δ = −θ · g/||g||2 (the multiplication here is element-wise), and use Adam to update θ instead.
Each element of θ controls the perturbation magnitude for the corresponding pixel, and we initialize all elements in
θ with θ0. g is the gradient of hinge loss f(x, t) = max(max{Z(x)i : i 6= t} − Z(x)t,−κ) w.r.t x. This hinge
loss corresponds to the goal of causing the network to classify the input as a target class, so its gradients could tell
us how we should perturb the legitimate image. Normalized gradient g/||g||2 is taken here so that the norm of δ is
independent from the scale of g. Note that although θ · g/||g||2 will not strictly follow the direction of g/||g||2 or
move along that straight line like the way ǫ · g/||g||2 does, this technique still works as shown by experimental results.
The pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1. The out_step is designed for high-confidence adversaries, which are more
likely to transfer to another model, since they usually needs greater perturbation.
2
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Figure 1: The left figure shows the testing points of our synthetic dataset. The right figure shows the intermediate and
final result of our and CW attack. One can see that the CW’s final steps and ours’ steps nearly coincide, indicating
that we could use gradients to reduce search space. Note that the decision boundary shown here is an approximate one
rather than the real one learned by the classifier.
2.1 Intuitive Explanation
We first illustrate the principle of our method in a simple scenario. We create a synthetic dataset which consists of data
points lying on the 2D plane. As shown in Figure 1, the dataset has two classes. Each of them has 1,000 points for
training and 200 for testing. It is a naive classification problem whose ideal decision boundary is x1+x2 = 10, where
(x1, x2) represents each point.
We train a small multi-layer perceptron as the classifier, which reaches 100% accuracy on both training and testing data.
We then apply CW and our method to find the adversary for a randomly picked point. The intermediate and final result
of the search process is presented in Figure 1. By constraining the perturbation with gradients, our method actually
reduces the search space. In this simple scenario where the decision boundary is a straight line, the fastest way to find
an adversary is to move along the direction of the gradient, which is perpendicular to the decision boundary. That is
exactly what our method’s search trajectory looks like. Also note that the last several steps of CW attack directly fall
into the search space of ours. The fact indicates the reduction of search space resulted by our method doesn’t exclude
the optimal results CW attack tries to find, which in turn proves the rationality of our method. Even though this is
too simple an example for the much more complex image recognition tasks and neural networks, it still offers some
intuitive thoughts. The effectiveness of our method will be further demonstrated by experimental results.
3 Experimental Evaluations
Dataset. We perform our experiments on CIFAR-10 [7] and ImageNet [8]. For CIFAR-10, we pick the first 1,000 test
images when applying attacks. ImageNet is a large-scale dataset which has 1,000 classes, and we randomly choose
500 validation images from 500 different classes to evaluate our method. The target label of the attack is also randomly
chosen while being ensured to vary from the true label.
Model Topology. For CIFAR-10, we choose the same CNN used in [6], and it reaches the accuracy of 76.7% on test
images. For ImageNet, we use the pre-trained Inception v3 from Tensorflow [9].
Baseline. We compare our method with CW attack, L-BFGS, and I-FGSM. We use the ℓ2 version of I-FGSM to
ensure comparisons are made under the same distance metric. Also the classification loss for I-FGSM and L-BFGS is
changed to the aforementioned hinge loss for direct comparison. We adopt the implementation in Cleverhans [10] for
these baselines.
Parameter Setting. For I-FGSM, we gradually increase the maximum allowed perturbation magnitude ǫ and stop
when it successfully reaches adversaries for all test images. For L-BFGS and CW, we first fix max iterations to 100,
which specifies the maximum number of iterations the attack can update its perturbation under a certain constant c.
Then we tune their parameters, e.g. the learning rate for CW attack, to make them first reach high attack success
rate within relative few iterations, since the attack’s success should be of the highest priority. This tuning process
is based either on the empirical results reported in original papers or on our own experimental observations. When
3
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Table 1: The success rate and ℓ2 distance for CIFAR-10. We claim success if the network indeed classifies the adversary
as the target class. When the success rate is not 1, the ℓ2 distance is the mean of only successes. The numbers in the
first row correspond to the confidence of the resulting adversary.
0 5 10 15 20 25
prob dist prob dist prob dist prob dist prob dist prob dist
Our1 100% 0.856 100% 1.008 100% 1.146 100% 1.280 100% 1.415 100% 1.547
CW1 100% 3.220 100% 3.609 100% 3.937 100% 4.225 100% 4.475 100% 4.708
CW3 100% 2.459 100% 2.685 100% 2.888 100% 3.109 100% 3.335 100% 3.531
CW6 100% 1.876 100% 1.977 100% 2.032 100% 2.058 100% 2.089 100% 2.096
L-BFGS2 100% 0.941 100% 1.152 100% 1.306 100% 1.533 100% 1.715 100% 1.885
I-FGSM 100% 1.409 100% 1.531 100% 1.625 100% 1.704 100% 1.754 100% 1.794
Table 2: The average iterations used for CIFAR-10. The numbers in the first row correspond to the confidence of the
resulting adversary.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Our1 28 28 30 34 38 42 47
CW1 27 25 23 22 22 21 21
CW3 109 108 108 106 103 100 98
CW6 197 200 207 213 219 223 228
implementing our own method, we empirically assign values to the parameters, also trying to guarantee successful
attacks with only a few iterations.
3.1 Result Analysis
When running experiments, we mainly focus on two aspects: the attack success rate and the ℓ2 distance. An adversary
is called a success if the neural network indeed classifies it as the target class. The average ℓ2 distance between the
legitimate image and its adversarial counterpart is calculated to show how much distortion the algorithm introduced.
When the success rate is not 100%, we only take the average of successes. We also pay great attention to the average
total number of update iterations of CW and our method. For both methods, each iteration corresponds to a single
step made by Adam optimizer. We also apply the same abort early technique in the implementation of our method as
CW, i.e., when no improvement is gained, both algorithms will abort early to avoid the meaningless search. Thus, the
number of iterations could indicate the amount of the computation taken by the algorithms. However, since I-FGSM
just computes the gradient every iteration without any optimization, and L-BFGS performs line search within each
of its so-called iteration, the computational cost behind each step is not comparable to our method or CW attack.
Therefore, there is no point or is difficult to conduct a fair comparison between them in this aspect.
For CIFAR-10, we generate adversaries when confidence is in the set {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30}. The results are shown
in Table 1 and 2. Note that our method reaches the smallest ℓ2 distortion while successfully attacking all test images.
While Our1 only spends 34% of the iterations of CW3, it reaches the ℓ2 distortion which is only 41% of that of CW3.
Besides, even though CW6 searches for 4×−5× more iterations than Our1, its perturbation is still 66% greater than
ours. Compared with L-BFGS and I-FGSM, our method could still produce superior results.
For ImageNet, we only present the results of adversaries with confidence equals to 0. As shown in Table 3, Our1
successfully finds all adversaries and meanwhile introduces the least amount of perturbation. On the contrary, CW
attack doesn’t produce comparable results even with 6× of our iterations. I-FGSM and L-BFGS2 also lead to inferior
results than ours, meanwhile the latter one takes more computational cost. Thus, it is proved that our method maintains
its effectiveness on the large-scale dataset.
4 Conclusion
Adversarial attack has recently drawn significant attention in the deep learning community. The gradient-based adver-
sarial example crafting scheme, i.e, FGSM and its variants, often introduce visually perceptible perturbation on the
adversarial examples. CW attack, as an optimization-based scheme, solves the above problem by searching for the
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Table 3: The success rate, ℓ2 distance, and average iterations for the adversaries of ImageNet.
prob dist iter
Our1 100% 1.083 52
CW1 99.6% 4.978 36
CW3 100% 3.030 116
CW6 100% 1.813 216
CW10 100% 1.497 312
L-BFGS2 95.8% 2.000 /
I-FGSM 100% 1.625 /
adversaries with small distortion. However, the incurred high computational cost could be intolerant in real applica-
tions. In this work, we propose to leverage the gradient information in the optimization process of crafting adversaries
by including it into the perturbation part. We illustrate that our proposed method can reduce the search space of the
adversarial examples and thus leads to fewer iterations of the search. Experimental results show that compared to other
tested methods, our method can also achieve a higher attack efficiency and a smaller perturbation or fewer iterations.
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